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Abstract 
A crucial factor in the success of any water quality trading market is its ability to cost-effectively 
reallocate nutrient allowances from initial holders to those users who find them most valuable; 
the market‟s trading efficiency. We explore causes of and solutions to trading inefficiency by 
assessing the impact on participant transaction costs and the tradeoffs that occur as a result of 
policy design decisions. Differing impacts of baseline-credit and cap-and-trade markets, the 
impact of trading rules and monitoring regimes are discussed in this endeavour. Possible 
solutions of increased information flows and regulatory certainty are also discussed. We then 
apply this framework to three existing water quality trading schemes; two from the US, and one 
from New Zealand. We use this experience to extract general recommendations for policy 
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1.  Introduction 
Nutrient trading is a market mechanism to address nutrient loss that leads to water 
pollution. Nutrient markets are a „command but not control‟ approach, in that they limit nutrient 
loss by creating fixed numbers of allowances which entitle their holders to release a defined 
amount of nutrients into waterways but do not explicitly define how reductions to meet these 
limits should be achieved. Sources of pollution can trade nutrient allowances to maximise profit 
in line with their individual costs of pollution control.  
This review focuses on the process of trading allowances in nutrient trading markets. 
Efficient trading is a key component of a nutrient trading system, and occurs when a system 
minimises the costs of reallocating allowances from their initial users to the users who find them 
most valuable and hence allocates allowances in the most cost-effective way.  Trading efficiency 
is distinct from overall system efficiency, which also depends on how efficiently environmental 
targets are set (are marginal costs equal to marginal benefits?).  
Trading efficiency maximisation is of particular importance as it enables the benefits of 
market system to occur. If trading is inefficient and allowances cannot effectively move from 
their initial allocation to where they are most valued then the costs of pollution control will 
increase. Those who can most cheaply mitigate are only motivated to do so if they can easily and 
cheaply trade their resulting surplus allowances to those who cannot cheaply cut pollution. If this 
trading is constrained by poorly designed policies and high transaction costs, then the true 
benefits of a market system cannot be achieved. 
Trading efficiency can be maximised through good policy design. Decisions over the 
scope of the nutrient trading scheme, the form that the scheme takes, the monitoring approach 
used and the acceptance or avoidance of transaction costs all have a significant impact on the 
level of trading efficiency that a scheme eventually attains. This paper attempts to examine 
exactly which policy options maximise this trading efficiency by examining the literature and 
assessing existing schemes. While some policy options and choices will be catchment specific, 
some will be generally applicable. When reviewing the literature we try to separate the 
idiosyncratic geographic features of particular case studies from differences arising from different 
policy choices to understand the general lessons for water quality markets and specifically the 
market we are developing for a New Zealand watershed
1.    
                                                 
1 This paper is written as part of the Nutrient Trading and Water Quality research programme which is 
being run by Motu Economic and Public Policy Research in Wellington, New Zealand. The programme aims to 
design and simulate a prototype nutrient trading system for the Lake Rotorua catchment, in conjunction with a 2 
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Despite the clear importance of maximising trading efficiency in nutrient markets there is 
little attention paid to the issue in the design of nutrient trading schemes worldwide. Few existing 
or proposed nutrient trading schemes maximise trading efficiency; indeed, many seem to have 
been designed with very little thought at all of trading efficiency. Investigation of the literature 
and existing systems informs a framework which we use to assess three existing nutrient trading 
schemes in terms of their trading efficiency. These assessments, of the Lake Taupo trading 
system in New Zealand, the Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading System in the US and the Long 
Island Sound Nitrogen Trading Market in Connecticut, US, also help elucidate the importance of 
maximising trading efficiency but also the difficulties that arise in practice.  
The review is set out as follows. It first introduces the problem of transaction costs, and 
the cost they place on trading efficiency. This is extended to examine the sources of these 
transactions costs and the trade-offs that can occur when attempting to maximise trading 
efficiency. The key dimensions of policy design that impact on trading efficiency are discussed in 
turn in section three; the scope of the scheme, the differences between baseline-credit and cap 
and trade schemes and the impact of this decision on monitoring and transaction costs are 
outlined in this endeavour. The paper then explores the impacts that policy choices over trading 
limitations can have on transaction costs and trading efficiency. General solutions to minimise 
transaction costs are discussed in section ‎ 5 under two headings: information flows and certainty. 
Existing scheme assessments are presented in section ‎ 6, and section ‎ 7 concludes. 
2.  Transaction costs 
Trading efficiency can alternatively be defined as an absence of participant transaction 
costs. As a result, we can also think of maximising trading efficiency as minimising participant 
transaction costs. We define transaction costs as any cost faced by a participant associated with 
making a trade, in addition to the allowance price. There is wide variation in the definition of 
transaction costs throughout the literature (McCann et al, 2005). We use a narrow definition that 
focuses solely on the costs of trading that are faced by the participant in the market as a result of 
trading. Set up costs or compliance costs which are independent of the trading decision are not 
included as these will not affect trading efficiency, which is our focus. Our definition includes the 
costs of gathering information, bargaining, decision making, any excessive costs of trade 
approval, and in baseline and credit schemes, baseline setting and monitoring. For maximum 
gains from a trading system, transaction costs should be minimised as much as possible, while 
                                                                                                                                                        
group of stakeholders and scientists with specialist knowledge of the region. An overview of the initial prototype 
design is published as Motu Working Paper 08-02 (Lock and Kerr, 2008). 3 
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ensuring environmental integrity: “The net gain from implementing a policy is the abatement 
cost savings minus the transaction costs; if the transaction costs are too high, they can offset all 
or a major part of the abatement cost gains from implementing the policy.” (Tietenberg 2003: 
484). 
Transaction costs directly affect trading efficiency. High transaction costs lead to trading 
delays and allowance hoarding. Intuitively, at any level these transaction costs will discourage 
trading parties from transferring allowances to their most valuable uses. We have little empirical 
evidence of the impact of transaction costs on trading. Two studies address transaction costs 
directly. Kerr and Maré (1998) found that oil refineries were less likely to trade allowances if they 
faced high transaction costs during the US lead phase down. Gangadharan (2000) found that 
transaction costs in the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) were a significant 
factor explaining firms not participating in the trading system. This evidence supports our 
analysis that high transaction costs impact negatively on trading efficiency. 
 As a result, regulators should look to minimise costs at the time of trading, and 
maximise trading efficiency as much as possible, unless the transaction costs have a valid trade-
off in improved environmental certainty, or, are unavoidable. Examining whether this is the case 
is most straightforward if we address the sources of transactions costs, and how these can be 
avoided, individually. These sources of reduced trading efficiency are set out in the central box of 
1, and discussed further in the following section. 
Figure 1 : Sources of Transaction Costs 
 
2.1. Transaction cost sources 
Optimising costs arise as the trading participant has to adapt their operations for the new 
regulation, and learn what the most profitable level of production and/or mitigation is for their 
land. These costs can be minimised by providing full information to participants on possibilities 
and mitigation options.  4 
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Monitoring costs occur as transaction costs if participants face the costs of measuring 
and monitoring at the time of making a trade. This will occur in any system where monitoring is 
carried out ex ante. Schemes can be designed such that monitoring is carried ex-post, an 
approach that transforms monitoring into a compliance cost, which has no impact on trading 
efficiency. This monitoring issue and the interactions between monitoring costs and nutrient 
trading market form are discussed in section ‎ 3.2.1.  
Trading limits are any rules which restrict trading between participants or increase the 
cost of trading for traders. There are many examples of these sorts of transaction costs, and 
while some trading limits are justified on grounds of decreasing environmental uncertainty, many 
are not, and serve to reduce trading efficiency without a balancing positive environmental 
impact. Discussion of the various forms of trading limits and their impact on a trading systems 
trading efficiency are discussed in section ‎ 4. 
Search and bargaining costs are the costs borne by traders when looking for other 
participants to trade with, and in negotiating an appropriate price for any nutrient allowances. 
These costs can be minimised by improving liquidity, information flows and through the use of 
central traders and online trading systems. These solutions, and international examples of their 
application, are discussed in section ‎ 5.  
Any trades that are carried out must be approved and registered with the regulator to 
ensure that they are recognised come compliance time. If the participants face a cost when 
registering trades, then this too will be borne as a transactions cost and decrease trading 
efficiency, and will act to dissuade participants from trading. An example of this is present in the 
Lake Taupo nutrient trading scheme: to register trades both participants (buyer and seller) must 
complete a compliance process which will cost each between NZ$1000 -$3000  (Environment 
Waikato, 2009). Minimising the cost of registration through the use of online registration system 
and simplified compliance are discussed as part of section ‎ 5.1.  
2.2. Trade-offs 
The goal of minimising these transaction costs and maximising trading efficiency may 
seem like obvious ones but, as discussed in the introduction, existing nutrient trading schemes 
worldwide do not seem to have aimed for or achieved this. The likely reason for this is that there 
are significant costs in building a nutrient trading scheme that achieves high levels of trading 
efficiency. Generally the cost occurs as a financial or time expense of designing and running an 
efficient system. However, under particular circumstances these costs can also be faced as a 5 
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decrease in the environmental certainty of the outcome. This particular case, and the trade-off it 
implies, is explored in the following section. 
As will be explored, maximising trading efficiency generally requires that there are no 
restrictions on trading and that the system as a whole is as flexible as possible. While this 
approach ensures that allowances can cost effectively move from initial holders to those who 
value them the most, if there is any uncertainty or known differences in the relative impact of 
nutrient discharge cuts,  this free trade can also lead to environmental uncertainty. This 
environmental uncertainty can occur if the actual impact of any nutrient discharges or reductions 
on the final environmental goal is not totally certain (as is often the case when including non-
point sources in a trading scheme). If this is the case regulators cannot be sure that a decrease in 
discharges by one participant will totally offset an increase in discharges from another 
participant. As a result, any trading between these participants will increase environmental 
uncertainty. 
While this environmental uncertainty might also occur under command and control type 
required reductions, it is likely to be a larger issue in a flexible trading scheme for a few reasons. 
There will be significant movement of discharges around the catchment under a trading scheme, 
with increases in some areas and decreases in others. There is also likely to be a higher number 
of mitigation methods under a flexible trading scheme, if these differing methods and spatial 
locations of mitigation have differing effects then the actual outcome of the scheme will be more 
uncertain than non-trading regulation. If a trading scheme is more successful in causing large 
shifts in nutrient discharge behaviour this too will magnify the uncertainty. Scientific 
understanding and modelling of nutrient discharges are based on status quo activities and 
discharge levels. Anything which causes large shifts away from this status quo level of activity 
will shift further away from accepted scientific understanding and will be associated with an 
increase in the uncertainty of the environmental outcome.  
There is likely to be a cost to this uncertainty even if the likelihood of better or worse 
than expected environmental outcomes is equal. If the marginal damage of nutrient leakage into 
the lake is increasing with discharges, then this uncertainty will result in a lower expected level of 
social utility as uncertainty increases. This cost of uncertainty is shown in the left panel of Figure 
2 below. A related issue is the actual state of the relationship between environmental risk and 
trading efficiency. If the relationship between the two is non-linear, for example if variability 
grows increasingly as trading efficiency increases, then a lower level of trading efficiency will be 
preferable relative to a situation where a linear relationship exists between the two. It is unclear 
what the likely relationship will be. 6 
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2.3. Formal Depiction of Trade-off 
In a bid to decrease the cost of uncertainty regulators often introduce trading rules and 
increased monitoring and measuring at the time of trade. While this will decrease environmental 
uncertainty these regulations also act as transaction costs and decrease trading efficiency. This is 
clearly a balancing act – increasing the restrictions and costs of trading will decrease the benefits 
of trading. If this is taken too far, then no trade at all could be the result. Even small restrictions 
on trade will have a cost though. This trade-off is depicted visually in Figure 2. 
 Figure 2 shows the social benefit and cost of nutrient discharges into a lake. The 
marginal social cost of nutrients being discharged into the lake is given by the upwards sloping 
MD curve, indicating that this cost is increasing as nutrient discharges increase. The aggregated 
marginal value of discharging nutrients into the lake for landowners is given by the MV curve, 
which is decreasing as the level of nutrients discharged into the lake increase, indicating 
deceasing marginal returns to discharging. The equilibrium gives the optimal level of nutrient 
discharge, Q*. The MV line can also be thought of as a reverse of the marginal cost of reducing 
discharges. The first reductions of nutrients come cheaply, but as more reductions are made the 
marginal cost of the mitigation increases.  
In the left hand diagram the MV line is drawn equal to MC*, where marginal costs are at 
their lowest, most efficient level. This occurs when only those who can most cheaply cut nutrient 
discharge do so. The only feasible policy that could achieve this efficient marginal cost outcome 
is a trading scheme with no trading restrictions; that is, one that is fully trading efficient. 
However, if there is uncertainty about the environmental impact of relative cuts and increases in 
nutrient discharges, then this free trading scheme will also be susceptible to uncertainty about the 
environmental outcome. This uncertainty is indicated by the band around Q*; the sum cost of 
this uncertainty is given by the shaded area
2.  
To avoid this uncertainty, regulators may look to restrict trading in some way, for 
example by limiting who can participate or by requiring extra monitoring and measuring
3. This 
will have two effects, both of which are shown in the right hand diagram of Figure 2Error! 
Reference source not found.. The first effect will be an increase in environmental certainty, 
which is shown as a tightening of the uncertainty band around the goal level of discharge, Q*, 
which results in the disappearance of the cost of uncertainty. However, restricting trade in this 
way will also decrease the trading efficiency of the scheme, leading to higher costs of achieving 
                                                 
2 This area is given by subtracting the economic cost if nutrient discharge levels were higher than expected, 
and fell at the high end of the uncertainty band, from the surplus that if nutrient discharges were lower than 
expected, and fell at the low end of the uncertainty band. 
3 These and other restrictions on trading are discussed in section ‎ 4 below. 7 
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any environmental goal. This is shown by a shift upwards of the marginal value line from MV* 
to MV1: this MV line is no longer equal to efficient marginal cost as the trading restrictions mean 
that mitigation is no longer being carried out only by those who can most cheaply mitigate. The 
cost of this is shown by the increase in the price of the final unit of mitigation rising from Ptrade 
to P1, and also by the shaded area which represents the cost of the loss of trading efficiency in 
terms of transaction costs.  
Figure 2: Trading Efficiency/Environmental Uncertainty 
 
The trade-off between trading efficiency and environmental certainty is neatly captured 
in these two diagrams. The left diagram shows the case where loose trading rules and high 
trading flexibility allow trading to ensure that any mitigation is carried out by those who can do 
so most cheaply. This allows environmental goals to be reached at lowest possible cost. 
However, there may be an element of uncertainty as to what the actual environmental outcome 
of such a trading scheme may be. The right hand diagram demonstrates the costs that are borne 
when regulators look to restrict this environmental uncertainty through limits on the market. 
While this approach avoids the uncertainty over the environmental outcome, it comes with a 
higher cost of attaining any environmental goal; environmental certainty has been traded off for 
trading efficiency. 
3.  Key dimensions of policy design that affect trading efficiency 
Minimising this trade-off between environmental certainty and trading efficiency, and 
minimising transactions costs more generally, depends largely on the design of the water trading 
policy. Good policy design can ensure clear information, flexibility and certainty for participants, 
which can help minimise the extent that these sources restrict trading efficiency. Policy design 
can also shift some of these costs out of the transaction costs sphere so that they occur as either 8 
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set up or compliance costs. These costs will only affect trading efficiency if they occur at the time 
of the trade – if the costs are independent of the trading decision then there will be no obstacle 
to allowances moving from initial holdings to those were they are most valued.  
The two most significant decisions in market design concern what sources to include; 
point sources, non-point sources or both, and what form the market should take; either a 
baseline and credit (offset) system or a cap and trade system. The relative merits of these choices 
and the impact that they have on transaction costs and trading efficiency are discussed first. 
These basic system design decisions fundamentally impact all sources of transaction costs, but 
particularly inform the effect that monitoring has on trading efficiency. This relationship is 
addressed in some depth.  
Following these foundational market design decisions, the choice of whether and how to 
limit trading in a nutrient market has the next largest impact on trading efficiency. There are 
various motivations for these trading restrictions, and these are discussed along with 
international examples of their application. 
Solutions to address the optimising, search and bargaining, and trade approval sources of 
transactions cost are discussed more generally. Ensuring that any trading system provides good, 
easily accessible information to participants and regulatory certainty will help to minimise these 
sources of transaction costs. 
3.1. Scope: Point sources and non-point sources 
A first concept central to this discussion is the distinction between point sources and 
non-point sources. Point sources (PS) discharge pollution at a specific location, for example the 
outflow pipe at a water treatment station. Non-point sources (NPS) pollute less directly, for 
example via diffuse run off from land. Water quality regulation has traditionally set limits only 
for pollution from PSs. NPSs are more challenging to regulate because NPS nutrient loss is 
difficult to measure and is subject to seasonal and weather-related variation (Stephenson and 
Bosch, 2003).  As a result the inclusion of NPSs is likely to increase uncertainty about actual 
environmental impacts. There also tend to be a large number of relatively small non-point 
sources.  They are often individually owned farms rather than large possibly public or regulated 
companies. Despite these issues the incorporation of NPSs of nutrient discharge is often crucial 
to achieve environmental aims, as NPSs often cause the majority of discharges
4. This is also true 
                                                 
4 Carpenter et al. (Carpenter et al, 1998) report that 82% of nitrogen and 84% of phosphorus entering USA 
waterways comes from non-point sources.  9 
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for our prototype New Zealand trading scheme; non-point sources are the primary origin of 
nutrients entering the lake. 
3.2. Cap and trade and baseline and credit systems 
There are two basic types of nutrient trading markets: cap-and- trade, and baseline-and-
credit (or offset). The choice of scheme type has a large impact on the level of the trading 
efficiency of the system. To facilitate comparison we will assume that both types of market are 
set up with the same environmental goal. Cap and trade markets involve setting a comprehensive 
cap on the allowable discharge of a given nutrient over a catchment or watershed, and dividing 
this cap into individual, tradable allowances. These allowances are then distributed to market 
participants, and participants must obtain and remit an allowance for each unit of nutrients 
entering waterways from their property. Further trading rules can be written to ensure that the 
environmental goal is not compromised by trading.  If nutrient reductions from non-point 
sources are expected to be cheaper than additional reductions from point sources, it is efficient 
to include non-point sources.   
In a baseline and credit (offset) market not all sources of nutrient discharge are regulated. 
Baseline and credit systems involve some regulated participants facing a cap (individually or as a 
group with allowances allocated to individuals) in the same way as in a cap and trade system, but 
also include a voluntary component. Other sources outside this regulated group can opt into the 
system and participate in decreasing their nutrient discharges for credits. When these sources 
decide to participate, a baseline level of nutrient losses is set, generally by estimating nutrient 
leaching under best practice or business as usual. If this voluntary participant discharges less than 
its allotted baseline it can sell its surplus to the regulated cap and trade section of the system. 
When the system works as intended these voluntary reductions act as a substitute for nutrient 
reductions in the cap and trade segment of the scheme and the environmental goal is not 
affected. However, these systems do not always work as intended, and are particularly vulnerable 
to adverse selection.  
If baselines are estimated accurately for all possible participants, then any participants 
that opt in will do so because they can profit from reducing nutrient losses at a low cost and then 
selling the accrued credits on the nutrient market. However, if there is asymmetric information 
such that regulators do not have the full information of possible participants, and as a result 
baselines are estimated with error, then there can be a second reason for sources to opt in. If 
sources are given an erroneously generous baseline, then these sources can choose to participate 
and collect credits for environmental savings without doing anything to reduce their runoff. The 10 
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credits that they accrue from this participation are not perfect environmental substitutes for 
nutrient reductions by regulated sources, as no actual reductions have occurred.  If instead a 
voluntary source is attributed an erroneously stringent baseline, then they will simply choose not 
to opt in; there will be no balancing out of the environmentally harmful credits. This is adverse 
selection. These spurious credits unintentionally increase the level of the cap, and as a result, if 
this is not controlled for, they will result in violation of the environmental goal.   
The level of costs that are faced by participants at the time of trade is another significant 
problem with baseline and credit systems. Under a cap and trade scheme, the cost of measuring 
current discharges is faced by all participants as a set-up cost. However, participants in baseline-
credit type schemes only face the costs of optimisation, baseline setting, and registration if they 
choose to trade and opt in to the system. As a result these costs are borne as transaction costs. If 
a discharge source in a baseline and credit system does not trade then they will not have to adapt 
in any way to the market regulation – they can avoid learning the new system, the costs of 
optimising their operations, and obviously any baseline setting, measuring, monitoring and 
registering costs that they would have to face if they opted into the system and traded. These 
costs provide a huge barrier to participating and trading in a baseline-credit system, and are costs 
that are do not need to be outweighed in a cap and trade system. These costs will greatly 
decrease the overall benefits of trading for optional participants, possibly to the extent that they 
decide not to participate even if they can provide low cost mitigation. These transaction costs 
significantly decrease the trading efficiency of a system.   
The two systems each have benefits and costs. The advantages of cap and trade are more 
environmental certainty because of an explicit goal and compulsory participation, and greater 
efficiency because more sources are able to trade and mitigate emissions. The disadvantages are 
that determining an environmental goal (cap) and allocating permits to all sources can be 
politically difficult, and that monitoring all participants is a significant and costly undertaking. 
Baseline and credit systems are more easily and cheaply established at a small scale. The 
disadvantage of baseline and credit is that including fewer sources reduces market efficiency, as 
participants have fewer trading partners with consequently less variation in mitigation costs. The 
difficulty of accurately setting a baseline is another disadvantage of baseline and credit markets; 
these baselines are often set at „business-as-usual discharges‟, which by definition are a 
counterfactual; estimating these wrongly will significantly affect the outcome of the policy. The 
transaction costs caused by baseline setting are another downside of these baseline-credit 
systems. Also, non-compulsory participation combined with inaccurate baselines introduces a 
risk of adverse selection, where participants can choose to participate and receive spurious 11 
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credits without actually abating nutrient runoff. This was a reported outcome of voluntary 
participation in the US Acid Rain Program(Montero, 1999).  
Clearly, a trade-off exists between the completeness and related efficiency gains of a cap 
and trade system, and the low relative administrative and political costs of the adverse-selection 
afflicted baseline and credit approach. Existing international examples are overwhelmingly 
baseline and credit systems, with our research only finding cap and trade systems in two 
instances
5, compared with the more than 55 baseline-credit systems we found worldwide 
(Selman et al, 2009). These systems also achieve different levels of trading efficiency and 
transactions costs, predominantly due to the different level of monitoring and measuring costs 
that each system requires. 
3.2.1.  Monitoring and enforcement 
Any regulation (with or without trading) must specify how and when emitters are 
monitored, and whether emissions are „monitored‟ in advance (ex-ante control) or once they 
have occurred (ex post monitoring).  The method of determining emissions for regulatory 
compliance is critical for the environmental integrity of the system and also for the flexibility 
individual participants have in how they comply and their certainty about the effect of their 
actions on their compliance. Monitoring requirements can also have a large impact on the trading 
efficiency of any nutrient trading system. 
Many water quality regulations require that non-point sources inform regulators as they 
make changes in management or production and assess the future environmental impacts of 
those changes before approving them.  For example the Lake Taupo system (Environment 
Waikato, 2009) requires farmers to submit farm management plans for the coming year.  Other 
systems monitor emissions ex-post based on actual behaviour.  The choice of timing of 
monitoring partly determines which measures are available to be monitored: ex ante monitoring 
defines certain activities that will be undertaken such as a management plan – these activities are 
monitored throughout the year once the plan is established; ex post monitoring relies on data 
that can be verified after compliance and infers emissions from these data using a model.  
These dimensions are summarised in  
Table 1:  Comprehensiveness of Monitoring 
Table 1Error! Reference source not found., where the arrow shows the direction of 
greater trading efficiency. Note that the level of monitoring is largely a factor of whether the 
                                                 
5The two cap and trade schemes are found at Lake Taupo, New Zealand and in Norway. 12 
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trading system is cap and trade or baseline and credit (offset). Cap and trade systems require 
participants to match their emissions and allowance holdings at the end of a compliance period, 
while baseline and credit systems are more likely to confirm that a trade meets its environmental 
target as part of the trading process itself. 
 
Table 1:  Comprehensiveness of Monitoring 



































      Sources monitored if 
they trade 
All sources always 
monitored 
Ex-ante – prescribed 
plan or activities   
 
Ex-ante credit and 
baseline 
Ex-ante cap and trade 
Ex-post – nutrient 
losses modelled based 
on verifiable 
information              
Ex-post credit baseline 
(rare)  Ex-post cap and trade 
 
Systems that require monitoring and approval of discharges and mitigation changes 
before every trade greatly increase transaction costs and decrease trading efficiency. These ex 
ante monitored systems place the cost of this monitoring only on those who trade, which will 
greatly decrease the benefits of trading, and as a result decrease the actual level of trade.  
Systems that use models to estimate mitigation and discharges based on available data 
and precedents are able to achieve higher trading efficiency. These ex post systems require all 
participants in the scheme to report data to allow measurement and monitoring of discharges, 
and not just traders. This ensures that the cost of compliance is not faced as a transaction cost, 
and instead is faced independent of the decision to trade. This approach to monitoring and 
measuring can also be carried out more cheaply than ex ante monitoring schemes. Instead of 
requiring individual assessment of each trade, an ex post system generally uses models and data 
which is easy and cheap to collect and allows trades to occur based on pre-set rules and 
precedents, and  monitors compliance after the trade has been completed. This decreases costs at 
the time of trade, which helps to maximise trading efficiency. 
It should be noted that if little trade and participation from sources is expected, then an 
ex ante system with monitoring and measuring only for trading parties may be justified. The cost 13 
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of setting up a full ex-post system may outweigh the benefits associated with its higher trading 
efficiency.  
While the decision of what monitoring approach to take follows closely from the 
decision over the scope and form of the nutrient trading market, other policy choices are less 
clear cut. Decisions over the application and extent of trading limits vary widely across different 
systems. Some of this variation is due to differing local environmental circumstances, but much 
of the variation is due to idiosyncratic policy design. Motivations for these trading limits and the 
impact that they have on trading efficiency are explored win the next section, along with 
examples of their application in schemes around the world. 
4.  Trading limits 
Trading limits and restrictions can be a significant source of transaction costs and trading 
inefficiency. However, well targeted trading restrictions and rules can also be an effective way to 
balance the trade-off between environmental certainty and trading. Trading rules are regulatory 
documents that define what constitutes an allowance,  how allowances can be acquired, bought, 
sold, used, held, retired, reported, leased, etc. They also specify who may trade, with whom and 
how trades are exacted. Restrictions on trade will always decrease trading efficiency, and as a 
result should be avoided where possible. However, if this loss of efficiency is balanced by a 
counteracting increase in environmental certainty, then the restrictions may be justified. The use 
of uncertainty ratios is a commonly used trading restriction which falls into this category. 
However, there are a number of international examples of trading restrictions which do little to 
improve environmental certainty. These, along with the importance of considering the impact 
that trading rules will have on market liquidity and new technology innovation, are discussed in 
turn.   
Trading rules specify under what circumstances allowances can be traded for emissions 
reductions in another time or place. These rules are political where allowances cannot be traded 
over regional council or national boundaries. They are environmental if the goal is to ensure that 
allowances have an „equivalent‟ effect on water quality. Trading systems are usually set up under 
the assumption that the scheme alone will ensure that nutrient mitigation in one area is a perfect 
substitute for mitigation in another area. However, if regulators are not confident that this is the 
case, then additional rules or pre-approval of trade may be a sensible method to decrease any risk 
to the environment. Example of the types of rules that may be appropriate include restricting 14 
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trading to between like sources, where like is defined by location within a watershed
6, or timing 
of nutrient arrival in the focal body of water
7. However, the most common form of these 
environmentally motivated trading restrictions is as uncertainty ratios.  
Uncertainty trading ratios can be found in many schemes internationally as a method to 
decrease the uncertainty about the actual environmental impact of trading, particularly in 
schemes which include NPSs. NPS discharge reductions are generally thought of as less certain 
than PS reductions, as their effectiveness depends on things such as the weather and storms 
(Selman et al, 2009). Uncertainty ratios are set such that for a NPS to get a credit equivalent to a 
one unit PS discharge reduction, the NPS would have to decrease their discharges by more than 
one unit. This approach is meant to work as a safety margin that ensures that even if NPS 
discharge reductions don‟t work as expected, water quality will not be negatively affected. While 
the use of uncertainty ratios may have some environmental benefit by ensuring that water quality 
is protected, they also impose clear costs on trading efficiency. The use of these uncertainty 
ratios provides a strong incentive to NPSs not to participate in any discharge trading system; any 
discharge reductions they make are worth significantly less than PS discharge reductions. This 
will work as a significant barrier to getting discharge allowances from the low cost abaters 
(presumed to be NPSs) to those who face high costs of abatement (presumed to be PSs), which 
by definition will negatively affect trading efficiency. However, if this is balanced by a significant 
decrease in the uncertainty of the environmental impact, then this may be justified. 
International trading schemes offer many examples of these uncertainty ratios. In the 
Lake Dillon scheme in Colorado, USA, two units of discharge reduction by NPSs are required 
for any one unit increases in discharge by PSs(Woodward, 2003). The Pennsylvania, USA, Water 
Quality Trading Program places a 10% „insurance‟ ratio on all trades to cover any mitigation that 
fails (Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, 2006a). Uncertainty ratios are also 
present or proposed in many other schemes.   
The use of uncertainty ratios is also preferable to other less certain mechanisms that are 
used to address this environmental uncertainty issue. Complicated and uncertain compliance 
systems, such as the approach used in the Lake Taupo scheme in New Zealand, may achieve 
environmental certainty but are associated with high levels of uncertainty for participants
8. Under 
                                                 
6 Such as in the Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading Program, which restricts trading to between sources in each of 
the two watersheds it encompasses. 
7 Such as in our proposed Lake Rotorua trading scheme, where allowances are appropriate for the year that nutrients 
will arrive at the lake (their „vintage‟).   
8 In the Lake Taupo scheme both the buyer and the seller have to have any changes to their emissions 
individually assessed and approved before a trade can be carried out. This mechanism provides very little certainty 
for participants to plan ahead, is costly, and as a result significantly decreases trading efficiency. 15 
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such uncertain approaches participants may choose to mitigate more than is efficient and over-
comply (buy additional allowances or not sell) to reduce risk.
9 This over compliance comes with 
a cost however, if the environmental certainty goal was pursued through a method which gave 
participants more certainty over their costs and obligations, such as the uncertainty ratios 
described above, then environmental certainty could be achieved at higher levels of production. 
There are also many examples of trading rules and restrictions that limit trading but do 
not offer any related environmental certainty gains. In the Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading 
Scheme landowners can accrue nutrient credit s for decreasing nutrient discharges through the 
application of almost any methods, but they cannot receive credits for land use change. There 
was political concern in the lead up to the nutrient trading scheme that its introduction would 
result in farms stopping operations and selling or shifting to alternative land uses. A clause was 
written into the law to ensure that farmers would not get credits for such a mitigation method. In 
the Connecticut Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program trades are only allowed 
between PS participants and the central exchange board. The board also sets the price of credits 
based on an assumed average mitigation cost. This approach results in no market clearing, and 
trading inefficiencies as a result. The restriction of participation to just PS participants is another 
trading rule which deceases trading efficiency, this limitation is present in at least 13 of the 57 
existing, proposed or inactive trading schemes worldwide (Selman et al. 2009).  
Trading system should also give participants the choice of whether or not to trade. While 
trading is expected to lower the cost of mitigation, in some cases nutrient discharges may be 
most cost effectively cut through onsite methods. Fang et al (2005) criticise the Minnesota 
system because it requires point sources to purchase allowances from non-point sources to 
comply – point sources are unable to meet their target through in-plant control methods. This 
restriction potentially forgoes more efficient nutrient reductions. It also retains a high level of 
control for regulators, negating the „command but not control‟ philosophy of market-based 
instruments (Shabman and Stephenson, 2007). Proponents of nutrient trading argue that 
individuals and firms have the best information to make nutrient reduction decisions. 
Local circumstances and political processes can also lead to trading rules. An example is 
the interaction between existing or parallel command-and-control regulations and any trading 
scheme. If the scheme is not carefully aligned with any existing regulation, trading efficiency can 
be significantly hindered. In Chesapeake Bay, Maryland, credits generated by trading cannot be 
used to comply with existing pollution control regulations, increasing polluters‟ compliance 
                                                 
 16 
Draft Copy – 14 September 2010 
burden (King, 2005). Later regulations can also create issues. The Maryland administration 
approved a set of trading guidelines in 2003, but in 2004 introduced a $2.50 per month “flush 
tax”. The effect of this tax has been to reduce demand for credits by wastewater facilities and 
reduce supply from agricultural participants – both sources receive subsidies to clean up 
pollution from income generated by the tax.  
4.1. Liquidity and innovation impacts 
The impact that trading limits have on market liquidity is another issue that should be 
considered when designing any trading restrictions. Market liquidity is essential in ensuring that 
search and bargaining costs are minimised. It should be relatively easy for a willing and able 
buyer to find allowances they can purchase, and vice versa. 
To maximise this liquidity designers of nutrient trading systems should examine how 
much flexibility a region‟s hydrology can handle. For example, the period for which participants 
are able to bank credits might be restricted to the mean residence time of a water body. In Miami 
River, Idaho, participants may only purchase allowances generated upstream from their point of 
discharge (King and Kuch, 2003). This is important to distribute discharge across the water 
body, but means that buyers can only trade with a subset of potential sellers. 
Allowing trading across more than one pollutant can significantly increase allowance 
liquidity. Stephenson and Bosch (2003) draw on emissions trading literature as an example and 
state that “cross pollutant trading could be a practical alternative in many watersheds.” Our 
information for the Lake Rotorua catchment suggests that nitrogen and phosphorus need to be 
independently reduced. However, applying the same trading frameworks to both nutrients could 
streamline and simplify the trading process, and there will be cases where a single mitigation 
practice is shown to reduce both nutrients simultaneously. 
Another issue that should be considered when introducing limitations and rules into a 
trading market is the impact this will have on the innovation and development of new 
technologies and mitigation methods. An often-cited benefit of environmental markets is that, 
unlike simple regulation, they can promote innovative responses to environmental problems. 
This can lead to nutrient reduction at lower cost. The design of a nutrient trading system needs 
to balance potential benefits from innovation with the need to ensure that innovative methods 
are beneficial to water quality. Shortle and Horan (2008) characterise lists of accepted abatement 
methods in US water trading systems as “defined more for [their] contribution to measurement 
than [their] contribution to cost-effective management.” Trading efficiency increases as more 17 
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pollution control options are approved, but only to the extent that the process of validating and 
monitoring new approaches does not create unrealistic transaction costs.  
In summary, the role of regulatory agencies in a nutrient trading system will affect trading 
efficiency. For trades to take place efficiently, regulatory agencies should focus more on 
monitoring and enforcement than on directly controlling. Commanding „what‟ happens but not 
„how‟ it happens embodies the shift to second-generation „command but not control‟ regulatory 
instruments. While concern of environmental uncertainty may motivate some trading 
restrictions, many trading restrictions will not result in an increase in environmental certainty. If 
these trading rules can be avoided, then trading efficiency can be maximised. 
5.  General policy responses 
Trading efficiency is most affected by the big decisions: what sources to include, whether 
to use a baseline-credit or cap and trade market, and whether to restrict trading in any way. 
However, good policy in these areas alone will not be enough to ensure that any scheme is 
maximally trading efficient. To avoid all sources of transaction costs and the resulting costs to 
trading efficiency, policies must be developed to ensure that participants have easy access to full 
information, political and regulatory certainty, and are able to flexibly respond to the regulation. 
These requirements and examples of their application in existing schemes are discussed in the 
following sections. 
5.1. Information flows 
Trading efficiency is supported through traders having ready access to high quality 
information. The transaction costs caused by optimising and search and bargaining costs can be 
minimised by proving good information to participants. Market design can improve the types 
and quality of information available to those who require it. 
Brokers and similar third parties make information gathering and decision making more 
efficient by accumulating knowledge of the trading framework and streamlining the trading 
process (Stavins, 1995). These organisations, in turn, require clear governing frameworks to 
ensure they are trusted and effective. Some markets have a single intermediary, known as a 
clearinghouse, which handles all allowance sales. The disadvantage of this approach is that there 
is no competition to encourage greater efficiency. Nevertheless, the World Resources Institute 
(WRI, 2007)  lists as a success the implementation of a clearinghouse for the Great Miami River 
Water Quality Credit Trading Program in Ohio. The Miami River clearinghouse purchases 18 
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allowances from agriculture and allocates them to „investor‟ companies in proportion to their 
level of investment. 
Online and automated trading facilities can also help to reduce optimising and search and 
bargaining transaction costs. Nutrient Net (www.nutrientnet.org), developed by the World 
Resources Institute, is a set of web-based tools to facilitate water quality trading. NutrientNet 
allows participants to connect with other possible traders, and to list credits for sale or bid on 
available credits. It also allows administrators and the public to access (confidentialised) trades 
and prices over time, and administrators to keep track of credits and compliance records. The 
system has been used for four trading programmes in the US (Selman et al, 2009), across five 
states. In addition to its benefit for buyers and sellers, NutrientNet assists administrators to track 
projects allowances and trades at minimal cost. 
NutrientNet, and its New Zealand counterpart Overseer, also allow landowners to run 
relatively complicated nutrient models onsite and in their own time, which allows participants to 
more effectively and cheaply optimise their operations to changing market conditions. The New 
Zealand Overseer model has been built to compute nutrient budgets and leakages using data that 
can be reasonably easily obtained by farmers or consultants, whilst still giving thorough and 
dependable output. For example, the Overseer pastoral farming model uses data on a farm and 
block level, and computes outputs based on farming region, animal shelters and feed pads, 
effluent management, animal species and their  management and stocking rate, supplements, 
nitrogen inhibitors and wetland areas, topography, climate, soil and pasture type, irrigation along 
with soil analysis and fertiliser inputs (AgResearch, 2009). The information that such models 
provide participants can greatly decrease optimisation costs and increase trading efficiency.  
Information flows are also likely to change over time. A case study by Woodward (2003) 
investigating the first trade carried out in the Lake Dillon reservoir in Colorado, USA, suggests 
that over time participants have a better understanding of the system and also a greater 
knowledge of possible trading partners. Both of these factors work to reduce search and 
information costs and transaction costs as a whole, which increases trading efficiency of a system 
over time. 
5.2. Certainty 
Certainty in the context of a nutrient trading system refers to certainty in the definition 
of an allowance and its properties, and to certainty in the trading environment. The trading 
environment has regulatory, political and scientific elements. If uncertainty is present in any of 
these spheres then all sources of transactions costs are adversely affected. If there is uncertainty 19 
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at any stage of trading then defensive, and trading inefficient behaviour, is likely to occur. For 
example, if participants expect future changes to regulation, but are unsure of what form these 
changes will take then they will struggle to optimise their operations and negotiation of 
appropriate prices for credits under this uncertainty will be difficult to resolve. They will be 
similarly averse to participating if uncertainties about trade approval and monitoring costs are 
present. This section explores these uncertainties and addresses how policy design can seek to 
avoid them. 
Clearly defining an allowance and its properties is an important step for efficient trading. 
Measurements of nutrient losses may need to consider soil type, slope, microclimate, heavy 
rainfall events, groundwater lag times, nutrient attenuation rates and residence times. It is not 
practical to directly assess these factors for every trade on every property. Authorities can instead 
develop standardised estimation methodologies.  Both buyers and sellers (or their 
representatives) use these methodologies to determine with certainty the nutrient loss they are 
responsible for. Online tools assist with this process. NutrientNet is one such tool; the Lake 
Taupo Trading Program (and Motu‟s prototype trading system for the Lake Rotorua catchment) 
uses Overseer, a nutrient budgeting model developed by AgResearch to estimate nitrogen and 
phosphorus loss from pastoral land (Selman et al, 2009). If participants can be certain in 
knowledge over the definition of an allowance then they can begin to mitigate and manage their 
nutrient runoff. Any uncertainty in this definition will increase costs in optimising operations and 
negotiating trades with fellow participants. 
Regulatory uncertainty also impacts on trading efficiency. If participants anticipate 
regulatory changes they may avoid trading until these changes occur or are ruled out. Clear 
advance guidelines of regulations subject to change and how any changes will be applied can 
reduce this effect. For example, in the prototype system designed for Lake Rotorua  we propose 
that any changes in the nutrient cap are borne by landowners, local government and central 
government according to a predetermined and well-publicised ratio (Kerr and Lock, 2009). 
Uncertainty at a political level can have similar effects. Whether regulators, policy makers 
and politicians will remain interested in the nutrient trading system is a major concern for trading 
efficiency. Changes in political priorities could see politicians introducing new regulations or 
relaxing existing ones. Participants who anticipate these actions may choose to hoard or sell at a 
loss any allowances they hold. In Lake Rotorua, analyses suggest that a trading system cannot 
lead to a measurable improvement in lake water quality for a century due to groundwater lags. 
This is a very long time in political terms.  20 
Draft Copy – 14 September 2010 
A stakeholder process can help to generate political support. Selman et al (2009) 
advocate both education and ongoing dialogue with stakeholders to ensure a system is 
implemented smoothly. Their appendix lists educational resources for communicating relevant 
information to a range of stakeholder groups. As a practical resource, Motu‟s environmental 
trading game is designed to introduce the principles of nutrient trading to a non-technical 
audience
10.  
Finally, the scientific information used to measure and address water pollution is subject 
to change, and provides another level of uncertainty for traders. New scientific information can 
be treated like any other potential change in regulation: uncertainty is avoided through clear 
specification of which elements may be subject to change and a declared mechanism for 
transferring liability (or unexpected gains) to allowance holders.  
As a general rule, certainty in all of its spheres can be maximised by the inclusion of well 
developed processes for managing any future change. It is highly unlikely that any trading 
scheme will continue unchanged indefinitely, so planning for the almost certain future change is 
the most effective method to promote certainty within a system. 
6.  Existing Scheme Assessments 
The above discussion informs a framework with which to assess existing nutrient trading 
schemes in terms of their trading efficiency. While these determinants of trading efficiency were 
discussed above in general terms, it is important to note that different water catchments will 
come with their own environmental, political and social conditions – what may work in one area 
may not be so successful  elsewhere. With this in mind we review trading efficiency in three 
existing trading systems. Reviews of the Lake Taupo trading system in New Zealand, the 
Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading System in the US and the Long Island Sound Nitrogen 
Trading Market in Connecticut, US, follow. The assessment of these different systems helps to 
illustrate the different approaches possible, and to crystallise the conclusions reached above.  
These systems were chosen for a few reasons. They represent a variety of different 
market types; Taupo is a strict cap and trade scheme, which is made up solely of non-point 
sources along with one additional large buyer. The Taupo scheme also highlights the difficulties 
that occur when introducing trading schemes into areas without prior experience of the trading 
approach and pre-existing legal frameworks. The Pennsylvania scheme is a baseline and credit 
scheme and operates over two watersheds and includes both non-point and point sources. It 
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provides an excellent example of the way trading rules are used to account for differences in 
nutrient mitigation across a scheme.  The Connecticut system includes just point sources, and is 
an interesting example of trading scheme ideas applied outside of the traditional trading scheme 
setup of trades between participants. 
Conclusions and policy recommendations follow the assessment of these three systems.  
 
6.1.  Lake Taupo Trading System 
 [Some facts: region, year of establishment, regulators, participants, relevant legislation etc] 
The Lake Taupo nutrient trading scheme is based in the watershed surrounding Lake 
Taupo, in the centre of the North Island of New Zealand. Evidence of declining water quality 
was found up to and through the 1990s as a result of excess nitrogen in the lake, largely due to 
the intensification of farming in the area. As a response, in 2003 a cap and trade scheme was 
proposed for the watershed as a method to control excess nitrogen leakage(Environment 
Waikato, 2003). Following various legal challenges over the intervening years, the trading scheme 
and cap will become fully operative before the end of 2010, and will allow trading of allowances 
amongst approximately 150 non point source (NPSs)
11 farms and between these NPSs and an 
environmental fund.  
The environmental goal for the scheme is to keep water quality in Lake Taupo at the 
level it was in 2001. Given the lags in nitrogen arriving in the lake, this has been translated as 
equivalent to a 20% decrease in nitrogen inputs on farms relative to 2001 levels, a decrease of 
153 tonnes of nitrogen on an annual basis. This is to be achieved by 2018 (Lake Taupo 
Protection Trust, 2009). To achieve this goal a fund, the Lake Taupo Protection Trust, was 
created to pay for nitrogen runoff reductions from farms. This is to be achieved through the 
purchasing of nitrogen allowances, retiring farming land, supporting relevant research and 
otherwise encouraging land use change in any other method to reduce nitrogen runoff levels. 
The Trust will administer the fund, which was established with $81.5 million in 2007, with 
contributions coming from central government, Environment Waikato (EW), and the district 
council (45%, 33%, and 22%  of the $81.5 million respectively)(Yerex, 2009). 
Allowances were grand parented to farmers with the allowance level equal to the highest 
level of nutrient runoff 2001-2005.  A quantity of allowances (equal to 14 tonnes per year) have 
been kept to allocate to those who were not farming during the benchmark years to allow for the 
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development of underdeveloped farms, particularly for local Maori
12 (Environment Waikato, 
2010). 
The trading system is operated by the regional council, Environment Waikato, but has to 
operate under and within New Zealand‟s national environmental legislation, principally the 
Resource Management Act (RMA). As a result, the actual trading of allowances between farmers 
is quite complex. Once landowners have found another participant to trade with they must then 
draft a contract with quantity, price and time of trade information, and then finally prepare new 
nitrogen management plans and apply for new consents for these from the local regulators, a 
process which is expensive for farmers (Environment Waikato, 2010). Sale of allowances to the 
Lake Taupo Protection Trust is more straightforward, if only because they clearly wish to 
purchase allowances and as a result transaction costs are smaller. The Lake Taupo Protection 
Trust had purchased 6 properties and retired their nutrient allowances, and also purchased 
nutrient allowances off one land owner (who changed land use to forestry) by July 2009, for a 
reduction in nitrogen leaching that sums to more than 20 tonnes annually (Kneebone, 2009). 
While the scheme is not yet fully operational, there have been a small number of trades carried 
out between farmers.
13 
6.1.1.  System Wide Elements  
Are there incentives to participate in the system? Does the system complement existing regulation? 
Participation is compulsory for all farms with leaching activities above a very low level 
(exclusions are given for forestry, existing golf courses and farms with very low stock and 
fertiliser rates).  Any new sources are obliged to buy or lease nitrogen allowances before they can 
begin activities which would result in nitrogen leaching. 
 The system has to work within New Zealand‟s national environmental legislation, the 
Resource Management Act (RMA). Environment Waikato‟s approach to dealing with this has 
greatly complicated the scheme; any trade has to be followed up with a new consent application 
and acceptance by all parties involved in the trade. Also, enforcement ability is limited; the 
Resource Management Act has set penalties that can be levied, often these are very low and may 
potentially not be high enough to convince farmers to abide with the schemes regulations. 
Environment Waikato believes that there may be a small group of resistant farmers, but through 
                                                 
12 These can only be acquired free only at very low levels, 2kgs per hectare – which will allow only a very 
low level of development without the purchase of more allowances. e.g. 0.55 dairy cows per hectare (Environment 
Waikato, 2007).  
13 Personal communication with Natasha Hayward, On Farm programme manager, Environment Waikato. 23 
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monitoring, education, and if necessary, escalating penalties, these landowners will be lead to 
participate in the scheme.
14 
Environment Waikato‟s interpretation of the RMA is not the only possible reading; we 
have advice that indicates that an ex-post system without consent changes would be workable 
under the RMA. This would have significantly higher trade efficiency (Rive et al, 2008). 
What are the relevant geophysical elements of the watershed/trading area? How does the system design 
respond to these elements?   
There are significant and variable lags in nutrient runoff leaching through to groundwater 
and on into the lake. These lags vary by the location of the nutrient application(Morgenstern, 
2008). However, the trading scheme does not take account of this time dependency due to there 
being no model available to accurately take these lags into account. The lake does have a high 
percentage of nutrients that reach the lake through surface water (i.e. with no time lags). 
6.1.2.  Flexibility   
[of pollutants] How many pollutants are covered under the scheme? 
Just one; nitrogen, although phosphorus discharge are also a problem. 
[of administrative compliance] Is there banking or borrowing? 
Banking and borrowing were avoided when the policy was first written up as it was seen 
as an added, unnecessary complication.
15 Farming groups have requested that the cap be applied 
on a three year average, as opposed to strictly every year, but EW have declined this request as 
they believe that the cap has been set at such a level as to allow flexibility without these 
changes.
16  
[of environmental compliance] Does the policy recognise lots of different ways to decrease discharges? And 
is it easy to introduce new recognised methods?  
Discharges are modelled using the Overseer program
17; any mitigating or reducing 
activities that can be measured in Overseer will be recognised in the system. This includes 
fertiliser application, stocking rate, cultivation methods and type, supplementary feed, effluent 
management (e.g. system type, feedpads), and new technologies (nitrogen inhibitors, wintering 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 Personal communication with Justine Young, Senior Policy Analyst, Environment Waikato. 
16 Following a recent Environment Court decision, the nutrient cap has been set at the farms highest level 
of leaching between the years 2001-2005. Early monitoring indicates that at most farmers‟ current operating 
intensity, this cap is not binding, with leaching levels often 10% below this benchmark. (Personal communication 
with Natasha Hayward, On Farm programme manager, Environment Waikato). 
17 Overseer is a nutrient budget modeling tool developed by AgResearch, New Zealand.  24 
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off)(Environment Waikato, 2007). Alternative mitigation methods can also be credited, but this 
has to be carried out through a non-compliant consent process; a method which would be more 
expensive and uncertain for the farmer.  
[of trading] Can you trade with anyone? 
Trading can be carried out between the NPS farms, or with the Lake Taupo Protection 
Trust. 
6.1.3.  Transaction Costs   
Are transaction costs (costs of gathering information, bargaining, trade approval, monitoring, 
enforcement; also transparency) minimised? 
EW has set up a basic central notice board where sale and purchase offers for nitrogen 
can be listed. This should help decrease searching and bargaining costs. Farmers also have the 
option of trading with the Lake Protection Trust, which will decrease these search costs for 
farmers looking to sell, but not those looking to buy.  
Due to the RMA, trading of allowances has to be carried out through a consent process, 
which is time consuming and expensive; Environment Waikato estimates that to update a 
consent (as both parties have to do to complete a nitrogen allowance trade) will cost $1000-
$3000 (Environment Waikato, 2009). This is a significant cost that will only be borne by 
participants if they trade
18. It would be much cheaper for participants if a more streamlined 
process was developed with changes confirmed by regulators but not requiring such a stringent 
consent process. 
Monitoring costs are paid by farmers; this will come out of the annual consent holders‟ 
fee. Due to the compulsory nature of the scheme these costs are not associated with trading; 
these are not transaction costs. Enforcement is carried out under the RMA; if farmers do not 
meet their consents (i.e. don‟t meet their agreed Nitrogen Management Plan) then this is 
enforced through provisions in the RMA. This is independent of trading.  
6.1.4.  Participant Certainty  
[scientific] Are the allowances and their relative 'environmental' worth clearly defined? Are potential 
changes clearly signalled? 
                                                 
18 There is a much smaller „consent holder‟ fee of approximately $400 paid by all farmers holding consents, 
regardless of whether they trade (Environment Waikato, 2009). 25 
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Each allowance allows the holder to discharge one kg of nutrients annually, where 
discharges are given by Overseer. This annual time period refers to when the nutrients leak from 
the farmer‟s property, not to when they arrive in the lake. 
The Overseer model is updated reasonably frequently; if it changes, then the new 
allowance allocation will be calculated using this new version, and any changes in consents will 
be calculated using this new version of Overseer (Environment Waikato, 2007). This may have 
an effect if new versions of the program give significantly different discharge results; however, 
this has not been found to be problem. To date, changes in versions have had negligible effects 
on estimates, and there is acceptance that the benefits of using the most recent version outweigh 
this small risk.
19 
 [regulatory] Is the regulation stable? Are any future changes well signposted? 
A process for reviewing the scheme in terms of environmental success and workability 
for users has been agreed following discussion and legal appeals between EW and stakeholders. 
This agreement brings much certainty to how future changes will be implemented.  
[political] Is there general political support for the trading scheme? Strong stakeholder support? 
Yes. Achieving the nitrogen cuts by purchasing nitrogen allowances off farmers, or 
purchasing and retiring land, both through the Lake Taupo Protection Trust has resulted in the 
costs of the policy being shared between farmers, local and district council, and the central 
government, which seems fair and equitable (Kerr and Lock, 2009). 
The Lake Taupo Protection Trust has been successful in making significant cuts to future 
nitrogen leaching within cost goals (Kneebone, 2009). Farmer‟s fundamentally support 
protecting water quality in the lake, and as farmers begin to get used to the idea of the trading 
scheme, acceptance has increased.
20   
There has been no political support for revisiting this issue; it also appears stable at the 
political level.
21 
6.2.  Long Island Sound Nitrogen Trading Market, CONN USA 
 [Some facts: region, year of establishment, regulators, participants, relevant legislation etc] 
The Long Island Sound Nitrogen Trading Market is based in Connecticut, USA. The 
scheme was set up and has run since 2002 following decreased water quality and increased 
                                                 
19 Personal communication with Natasha Hayward, On Farm programme manager, Environment Waikato. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Personal communication with Justine Young, Senior Policy Analyst, Environment Waikato. 26 
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hypoxia in the Long Island Sound and the introduction of a Total Maximum Daily Load 
(TMDL)
22 in the Long Island Sound (LIS) in 2001. The program includes only point source (PS) 
dischargers; 79 municipal owned sewerage plants.  
The environmental goal is set by the TMDL which is set by the US Environmental 
Protection Agency. The TMDL must be met by 2009, with a stricter one to be met by 2014; if 
the goal is not met the state will face hefty fines. To reach these federal limits the Connecticut 
Department of Environmental Protection has set yearly general permit limits which decrease 
annually towards the 2009 and 2014 goals.  
PS allocations of allowances follow the tightening environmental goal. PSs were all 
initially allocated credits based on discharge volume (from a 1997-99 baseline) at an average level 
(across all point sources) of nitrogen enrichment. Each year, each PS‟s allocation falls 
proportionately with the goal.  If the PSs discharge more than their allocation they have to 
purchase additional credits through the Nitrogen Credit Exchange (NCE), a so called 
„clearinghouse‟, which is overseen by the Nitrogen Credit Advisory Board (NCAB).  The NCAB 
sets the credit price at the end of each year and buys and sells at that price. The board sets the 
price equal to the average observed mitigation cost – that is they obtain information on costs of 
mitigation from all the PSs and calculate the total level of equalized nitrogen discharges 
decreased, and so set the price at this average mitigation cost
23. Credits are not limited to the cap; 
indeed the „market‟ has not balanced once. In the first three years of the scheme the PSs reduced 
total discharges below the annual goal, and received a net payout, but in the 4 years 2005-2008 
the PSs had to buy credits from NCAB (implying that the overall annual discharge goal was not 
met)(Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, 2010). This could not occur under a 
true tradable permit market where each credit purchased would be matched by one sold and the 
goal (cap) would have to be met and if it wasn‟t going to be then the price of credits would be 
                                                 
22 A TMDL is the primary regulatory method that US and state EPAs use to set the maximum pollution 
limits for water discharges.  
23 The „market‟ price is set using the following formula by the ECAB board (Connecticut Department of Environmental 
Protection, 2009) 
“The value of an equalized credit = Capital Costs + Operational Costs /Total amount of equalized nitrogen reduced from project 
facilities”  
Where "Capital Costs" were established by the Board as the annual amount spent by municipalities on nitrogen removal projects 
(this does not include grants). "Operational costs" were estimated by means of a survey sent to all Project Facilities. Department 
staff reviewed all survey data for consistency and reasonableness. The reduction in equalized pounds of nitrogen was calculated 
by subtracting the actual end-of-pipe pounds of nitrogen discharged by each of the Project Facilities from the "baseline" loading 
(level of discharge that would‟ve occurred with no additional treatment since 1997-99). This was then adjusted using equalization 
factors and summed to calculate state-wide equalized reductions. 
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bid up to a point where it would be most profitable to attenuate discharges. However, the PS‟s 
have only limited options for decreasing their discharges. While they can make adjustments to 
increase the efficiency of nitrogen removal of existing technology, as they did in the early years 
of the scheme, the majority of funding for upgrades comes principally from state and federal 
grants; if these are slow in coming through it seems unreasonable to punish individual 
municipalities.  While this is clearly not a market in the traditional sense, it does provide some 
environmental improvement (the cap will be binding on the state in 2009 and 2014) but keeps 
costs for PSs low by giving time for transition to occur.  
As the focus of the scheme is increasing water quality in the Long Island Sound, all PS 
discharges and reductions are adjusted so each use of a credit has an equal effect on water quality 
in the sound. To achieve this there are 23 different transmission coefficients for the different 
areas, computed by combining a river delivery factor and a LIS delivery factor (i.e. to the edge of 
the sound). 
6.2.1.  System Wide Elements   
Are there incentives to participate in the system? Does the system complement existing regulation? 
Participation is compulsory for PSs.  
The Nitrogen Credit Exchange program was motivated by the Clean Water Act and its 
requirement for cleaner water than is currently in Long Island Sound. They work together well – 
the USA EPA encourages and helps to fund nutrient trading programs. 
What are the relevant geophysical elements of the watershed/trading area? How does the system design 
respond to these elements?   
The use of delivery coefficients to equivalise discharges and reductions across the 
watershed matches the geophysical elements of the watershed well. This approach will aid 
achievement of the goal without restricting where future development takes place.  
6.2.2.  Flexibility   
[of pollutants] How many pollutants are covered under the scheme? 
One; nitrogen. 
[of administrative compliance] Is there banking or borrowing? 
There is no banking or borrowing in the system.  This is possibly due to the focus on 
flows, rather than stocks, of nitrogen. The state is obliged to meet the TMDL which is a measure 28 
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of flows into the sound not the total stock in the sound; banking and borrowing would make 
meeting this time dependent goal difficult.  
[of environmental compliance] Does the policy recognise lots of different ways to decrease discharges? And 
is it easy to introduce new recognised methods?  
Yes. A decrease in discharge is measured by monitoring – doesn‟t have to be upgrades; as 
mentioned above, in the first few years of the program a lot of discharges were cut through more 
efficient application of nitrogen removal techniques (Rocque, 2003).  That is, it is very flexible in 
allowing new methods.   
[of trading] Can you trade with anyone? 
The only explicit trading is between individual PSs and the NCE; implicitly this is trade 
between the PSs. No trade is allowed with non point sources (NPSs); the definition of the goal 
and hence total credit allocations in the trading system assumes that NPS discharges will be 
reduced by 10% over the time period through alternative regulation.   
6.2.3.  Transaction Costs   
Are transaction costs (costs of gathering information, bargaining, trade approval, monitoring, 
enforcement; also transparency) minimised? 
The PSs are given an estimate of what the credit price will be by NCAB in October of 
the applicable year, based on the first 8 months of the year‟s data. They are then given a final 
value in March of the following year and have to settle their accounts.  
As a result there are very low transaction costs for the PSs involved - the cost of trade 
approval and information gathering is borne by the state.   There are no bargaining or search 
costs.  
As inclusion in the scheme is non-voluntary, monitoring costs are independent of 
transactions. Monitoring has been performed by PSs in the sound area since at least 1993, it is 
not expected that any cheating will occur(Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection 
and New York Department of Environmental Protection, 2000).  
Trade enforcement costs don‟t apply – the penalty for not meeting any goals is in the 
form of extra credits you have to buy from ECAB. There have been no issues with PSs not 
complying. 29 
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6.2.4.  Certainty 
[scientific] Are the allowances and their relative 'environmental' worth clearly defined? Are potential 
changes clearly signalled? 
Emissions are clearly defined – they are measured at the PS outfall. This is then 
combined with the known transfer coefficients to get transferable credits.  
The price/value of credits is not known until the end of the year.  If the advance estimate 
is poor the market is inefficient and will not exactly meet the goal. However, as the credit price is 
set at the average mitigation price (which is decided by the NCE, who also provide the advance 
estimate) it is expected that the estimate will be based reasonably good information, and the 
actual price will not differ too much from the estimate.  
[regulatory] Is the regulation stable? Are any future changes well signposted? 
The discharge limits and transfer coefficients for each PS are set out in the Nitrogen 
General permit, which includes limits for each year in the next five year period, and an end goal 
for 2014. It is not expected that TMDL or the transfer coefficients will need changing
24, but if 
they do, this will be passed on to the individual PSs. To help ensure that changes are not 
necessary, the discharge limits have been set so that the TMDL will be met comfortably, this 
helps decrease the likelihood that changes will need to be made. There is a cost to this regulatory 
certainty though, overachieving the environmental goal will be associated with increased costs. 
 [political] Is there general political support for the trading scheme? Strong stakeholder support? 
Yes. The scheme is well established, with 7 annual trading rounds completed and over 
15.5 million credits exchanged with a value of about $45 million US. The sewage treatment 
plants like it because it saves them money over individual permit requirements, and the 
environmental groups are supportive because the scheme has already achieved cuts equal to 
more than 80% of those required to meet the  final 2014 goal
25. 
6.3. Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading Program, PENN USA 
 [Some facts: region, year of establishment, regulators, participants, relevant legislation etc] 
The Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading Program is based in Pennsylvania, USA. It was 
introduced to reduce nitrogen, phosphorus and sediment run off into Chesapeake Bay. 
Pennsylvania State is a member of the Chesapeake Bay Program, an association of states which 
aims to coordinate the improvement of water quality within the Bay, among other goals. 
                                                 
24 Personal communication with Paul Stacey, Bureau of Water Protection and Land Reuse, CONN. 
25 Ibid. 30 
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Following the signing of a renewed agreement in 2000, Pennsylvania moved to meet new 
nutrient standards set for 2010. This is intended to be achieved through a few channels; one of 
them being this nutrient trading system. The trading system allows trading between and amongst 
point sources (PSs) and non-point sources (NPSs).  
The environmental goal for the system is to achieve a cap which is set allowing for a 10% 
increase in industrial discharges (from 2002 levels) and a decrease in average level sewage 
discharge levels to 6 mg/l for nitrogen and 0.8 mg/l for phosphorus, at projected 2010 
flow(Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, 2006b). The trading system is a 
voluntary baseline and credit system and has been established to decrease the cost for large 
nutrient dischargers in meeting their more stringent new water quality requirements. The system 
accrues credits to those who decrease their nutrient discharges below a baseline, and allows these 
credits to be sold to nutrient emitters who can use these allowances in lieu of reducing their own 
nutrient emissions.  Typically these credits are generated by NPSs such as farms who introduce 
techniques and technologies to reduce their nutrient runoff below what is required
26 
(Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, 2009b). These credits are then 
purchased by PSs such as sewage plants or large industrial dischargers. 
Credits are traded through a market or through bilateral trades. An online trading system 
using the World Resource Institute‟s NutrientNet website has been set up, although this does 
not appear to have had much use to date (Selman et al, 2009). Supply of credits has also been 
encouraged through a program run by the Pennsylvania Environmental Protection Agency (PA 
EPA), where they have encouraged districts to facilitate farmers carrying out nutrient saving 
activities on the promise that the PA EPA will act as an intermediary and purchase the credits 
and hold onto them to on sell when there is demand. By 2009 this had generated reductions of 
over 87000 pounds per year of nutrient runoff(Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection, 2009b).  
As the focus of this trading scheme is on improving nutrient levels in Chesapeake Bay, 
the system incorporates trading ratios which adjust all discharges and reductions so that each use 
of a credit has an equal effect on bay water quality. These ratios compensate for any attenuation 
of nutrients over the journey from discharge point to the bay(Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection, 2009a). On top of these ratios, a reserve ratio of 10% is also applied 
as insurance against any credit generating activities that fail. 
                                                 
26 Examples of techniques include stream bank fencing, rotational grazing and no-till farming. 31 
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One final restriction is that trading can only occur between sources within the same 
watershed (two watersheds are included in the Pennsylvania scheme; the Susquehanna and 
Potomac watersheds); this is to ensure that both of these watersheds too are protected by the 
trading scheme, and not just the bay. A final restriction is that credits cannot be generated by 
retiring farmland. There appears to be concern that this policy would accelerate the loss of 
productive farmland. Even if this is economically efficient, this is barred under the 
scheme(Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, 2006a). 
6.3.1.  System Wide Elements   
Are there incentives to participate in the system? Does the system complement existing regulation? 
PSs and NPSs can only participate in the trading system if they have already applied 
some basic threshold level of nutrient reduction. PSs can only accrue credits for reductions 
below concentration limits set through National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) by the US EPA. PSs can trade to achieve these limits. 
 NPSs can only accrue credits if they have an approved plan and one of three 
technologies/mitigation activities in place. These prerequisites are not eligible for credits. 
The system was set up to assist existing regulation (NPDESs), and complements these 
well. 
What are the relevant geophysical elements of the watershed/trading area? How does the system design 
respond to these elements?   
Nutrient losses in the Susquehanna and Potomac River watersheds do not affect the 
other‟s water quality. As a result, sources can only trade within their own watershed, at any scale 
(stream to total). Delivery Ratios compensate for a nutrient or sediment‟s travel in water and will 
be applied to point and non-point sources. The ratio varies depending on the distance of the 
source from the mainstem of the Chesapeake Bay. The Edge of Segment (EOS) Ratio is a factor 
that is unique to each watershed model segment that has been determined by the Chesapeake 
Bay Watershed Model in order to estimate the EOS load for individual non-point sources within 
a watershed segment (differs for conventional till, conservation till, hay and pasture). The 
regulators also apply an insurance ratio of 10% to cover transactions that are ultimately 
unsuccessful. 
Credits can only be traded like for like; that is, nitrogen credits can only be used to meet 
nitrogen reduction requirements, and not phosphorus requirements. 32 
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6.3.2.  Flexibility   
[of pollutants] How many pollutants are covered under the scheme? 
Nitrogen, phosphorus and sediments, each traded separately. 
[of administrative compliance] Is there banking or borrowing? 
No. Credits must be surrendered in the year they are generated. 
[of environmental compliance] Does the policy recognise lots of different ways to decrease discharges? And 
is it easy to introduce new recognised methods?  
All activities must be certified before credits can be generated. The Department has pre-
approved calculation methodologies for use by persons seeking approval of credits. The 
Department will also consider other calculation approaches, although the proposal review time 
may take longer. 
However, credits cannot be accrued for converting productive farmland to other uses. 
[of trading] Can you trade with anyone? 
Yes, but only within each watershed. PSs, NPSs and any third parties (e.g. brokers) are 
eligible.  
6.3.3.  Transaction Costs   
Are transaction costs (costs of gathering information, bargaining, trade approval, monitoring, 
enforcement; also transparency) minimised? 
The cost of gathering information is low due to the use of NutrientNet as an online 
trading system; this allows easy investigation of market prices and options. It also lowers the cost 
of bargaining, as this can all be carried out online through a bidding mechanism.    
The trading process includes phases of certification (proposal approval), verification and 
registration. Traders have the option of using Nutrient Net to calculate credits, post credits for 
sale and trade credits. However, the PA EPA has indicated that all trades must be reviewed and 
approved before they can be used to meet permit limits.    
In an attempt to decrease the costs of this trade approval, the PA EPA has outlined 
acceptable contract terms for traders, and a model contract will eventually be available online. 
Monitoring NPS nutrient reductions is not plausible, instead, the department estimates 
the nutrient savings that will occur as a result of the change in activities or technologies, and 
verifies that these changes have happened. This will clearly be cheaper than monitoring, but may 
be less certain.  33 
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Enforcement costs for participants may be quite high. Those who purchase the credits 
are responsible for enforcing the terms of their credit purchasing agreement, although the 
department will take action if NPSs or third parties wilfully fail the contract terms. Exceptions 
also exist if reductions fail due to unforeseen events. Despite these exceptions, this risk is a real 
additional cost of trading. 
6.3.4.  Certainty  
[scientific] Are the allowances and their relative 'environmental' worth clearly defined? Are potential 
changes clearly signalled? 
Environmental worth of credits is clearly defined; one allowance is equal to one pound 
of reduction of the particular nutrient leaching per year. 
 
These three existing nutrient trading schemes serve to illustrate the importance of local 
characteristics to the design of a trading scheme. However, they also demonstrate that there are 
general similarities across successful systems, which can be applied regardless of the local 
circumstances to increase the trading efficiency of a scheme. These lessons are discussed in the 
conclusion below. 
7.  Conclusion 
Maximising trading efficiency should be a key consideration when designing a nutrient 
trading market. Minimising the cost of reallocating allowances from their initial holders to those 
who find them most valuable is essential in creating an efficient system. However, there are 
many different possible obstructions in achieving this trading efficiency, and combined with 
differences between catchment areas, it is very difficult to conclude on a universally optimal 
approach. An approach that may be effective and efficient for the prototype trading system that 
we are designing for a New Zealand watershed may not be effective in an overseas regulatory, 
political or physical environment, and vice versa. Despite these caveats, the discussion above 
does suggest four general guidelines that should be followed when designing a nutrient trading 
system in order to promote trading efficiency. 
Firstly, trading schemes should be designed with trading efficiency in mind from the very 
beginning. Consideration of the scope of the trading scheme and the choice of scheme type 
should be informed by an understanding of the tradeoffs involved in any decisions. While cap 
and trade schemes face larger set up costs, the inherently higher levels of trading efficiency that 34 
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they can achieve and their avoidance of adverse selection mean that these set up costs are often 
outweighed by long term savings and gains.  
Secondly, a similar understanding of the costs should be applied when considering the 
introduction of trading limitations. While trading rules and requirements may increase the 
environmental certainty of a scheme, this should be balanced by a consideration of the decrease 
in trading efficiency they also inevitable cause. Any restrictions on trading will make it more 
difficult for allowances to move from their initial allocation to where they are most valued, and 
will increase the cost of reaching environmental goals as a result.  
Thirdly, transaction costs will decrease, and trading efficiency increase, as trading markets 
are made more transparent, flexible and more certain. For the market to work effectively it needs 
to be simple for sellers and buyers to find each other, and to help to keep bargaining costs low, 
historical prices should be readily available. This improvement in information available for 
participants can be achieved with very little cost, and can make a sizeable impact on the overall 
efficiency of the scheme.  Online automated trading systems such as NutrientNet are an 
attractive mechanism to achieve this.  
Finally, regulation should be stable with clear and well understood and accepted rules, 
and the regulation should be written with the goal of controlling the environmental outcome, but 
not how it is reached. Regulation that relies on systems and rules, and that monitors and enforces 
these rather than relying on individual approval of every transaction will help to achieve this. 
Stability of the regulation can be enhanced through general political acceptance, which can be 
achieved more easily if stakeholders are involved and consulted throughout the policy 
development and introduction. To avoid efficiency losses from uncertainty, any changes to 
regulation as a result of new scientific information or political will should be well sign-posted. At 
the same time, the policy should be flexible to new methods of leakage mitigation or reduction. 
This will clearly be a balancing act. 
If these guidelines can be followed, then trading efficiency should be maximised. It will 
be up to policy makers to weigh up these increases in trading efficiency against any related 
increases in environmental uncertainty. It will depend on local circumstances and opinions as to 
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